The Amoralist and the Anaesthetic

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Abstract. This paper puts pressure on moral motivational internalism and rejects normative motivational internalism by arguing that we should be aesthetic motivational externalists. Parallels between aesthetic and moral normativity give us new reason to doubt moral internalism. I address possible disanalogies, arguing that either they fail, or they succeed, but aren't strong enough to underwrite a motivational difference between the domains. Furthermore, aesthetic externalism entails normative externalism, providing further presumptive evidence against moral internalism. I also make the case that, regardless of these particular conclusions, examining different normative domains alongside each other is a fruitful way to move debates forward.

It is often remarked, and more often implied, that whatever we end up saying about moral normativity will be roughly true of aesthetic normativity.[1] If, at the end of the day, we should be moral error theorists, then we should be aesthetic error theorists, as well.[2] If, at the end of the day, we should be moral non-cognitivists, then we should be aesthetic non-cognitivists, as well.[3]

When stated so baldly, it's not obvious that such a claim is true (though not obvious that it's false). Why, then, is this line of thought so compelling? We generally aim for unifying, symmetric, and parsimonious theories, of course, but it isn't just that. It must be at least in large part because many of the considerations we apply in the moral domain also fit the aesthetic domain. Mackie, for example, homes in on the built-in to-be-pursuedness of ethical values and judgments as the heart of their 'queerness'.[4] Here, however, he isn't just talking about ethical values and judgments, but about any objective values and any normative judgments at all. Any objective values would have this structure, he thinks, regardless of whether they were moral, aesthetic, epistemic, prudential, or something else.

There are, on the other hand, ways of putting pressure on the analogy between morality and aesthetics. Morality concerns action while aesthetics concerns observation or appreciation.[5] The demands of morality are categorical while the demands of aesthetics (to the extent that we can speak of such things) aren't.[6] And so on.

It's hard to deny that there are differences between morality and aesthetics. The question is whether those differences are enough to support adopting asymmetric metanormative views. I don't pretend to offer a full answer to this question here, but I will attempt to make some headway by looking at a particular issue: motivational

internalism.[7] This will not only shed light on motivational internalism itself, but present a productive but underexplored methodology for thinking through these large scale metanormative questions.

This paper defends three major theses. The first is aesthetic motivational externalism, the view that motivation does not necessarily accompany sincere aesthetic judgments. Second, aesthetic motivational externalism gives us new reason to doubt moral motivational internalism. Third, aesthetic motivational externalism also forces us to reject normative motivational internalism, the view that motivation necessarily accompanies sincere normative judgments. The conclusion, then, is that we should presumptively favor moral motivational externalism, and moral motivational internalists must come up with either new intuitions or new arguments to support their view.

In brief, I begin by presenting moral motivational internalism and the debate surrounding the possibility of amoralists. Section 2 considers an aesthetic version of motivational internalism and the aesthetic equivalent of the amoralist: the anaesthetic. I then defend the conceivability of anaesthetics and so aesthetic externalism. In the third section, I present a trilemma that we're then faced with. We cannot have (1) moral internalism, (2) aesthetic externalism, and (3) a parallel motivational analysis of these domains. Since (2) is off the table, we are in position of having to reject (1) or (3). In Section 4, I explore disanalogies that could ground a rejection of (3) and argue that these either fail to be disanalogies or else are irrelevant to the internalist question.

Section 5 approaches the issue from a different angle, by pointing out that support for moral internalism favors, and is often committed to, a more thoroughgoing normative motivational internalism. But aesthetic externalism shows that normative internalism must be false. Section 6 concludes that we have reason to prefer rejecting (1) to rejecting (3), and thus that we have some new, hitherto undiscussed, reasons to be moral externalists.

This discussion raises questions about internalism and normativity more generally, and regardless of which side one favors, the way each explains its response to these questions promises to illuminate deep structural features of ethics and normativity. As such, I attempt not only to shift the burden of proof to moral motivational internalists, but also to provide a way forward for both internalists and externalists, by thinking through internalism as part of a fuller metanormative picture.

1. The amoralist

It's important that we first have on the table an understanding of the motivational internalism debate in ethics. It starts with the popular and plausible view that there's some necessary connection between our sincere moral judgments and our motivation. In particular, motivational internalists (sometimes called judgment internalists[8]) connect these in the following way:

> **Moral (motivational) internalism**: Necessarily, if someone judges that she morally ought to φ, then she is (at least somewhat) motivated to φ.

There are several slightly different forms this can take, but the basic idea is that an individual who makes a sincere moral judgment is necessarily thereby motivated to act in accord with it. So, for example, if Andy judges that she (morally) ought to give to Oxfam, she is thereby motivated to do so. Not only that, but if Andy isn't at all motivated to donate, then she simply cannot have sincerely judged that she morally ought to do so. In other words, internalism is meant to be a conceptual truth, though it's sometimes also defended as a merely empirical truth.[9] (I am mainly concerned with the conceptual principle here, though I'll occasionally touch on the empirical version.)

For simplicity, I'll just call this view *moral internalism*, and its denial *moral externalism*. It's worth noting a few features of moral internalism. First, some forms replace 'morally ought to φ' with the action's being 'morally right', 'morally obligatory', or 'morally best'. Which of these (or other related notions) we choose won't be important for now, but will come up again later. Furthermore, such judgments must be sincere and made by those with mastery of moral language, i.e., by those who understand what moral terms mean.[10]

This sincere judgment must then be accompanied by at least some motivation, however small, to perform the relevant action. The motivation doesn't have to be overriding, and some accounts allow the motivation to be defeasible in certain ways. Andy, for example, having made a sincere judgment that she morally ought to donate to Oxfam, doesn't have to be more motivated to donate to Oxfam than to do anything else. Nor does she have to intend to donate to Oxfam. Furthermore, if she is practically irrational[11] or has a psychological disorder[12], she may fail to be motivated by her judgment.[13]

All this means that, if we can conceive of people who both make sincere moral judgments and do not feel any motivation to behave accordingly (and for whom no defeating conditions are met), internalism is sunk. In its place, we'd have externalism, the view that moral judgments are not necessarily accompanied by motivational force. Note, though, that even if these unmotivated people, called amoralists[14], don't actually exist, their mere *conceptual* possibility would suffice to refute internalism as a conceptual claim. In the remainder of this section, I'll present a few examples of potential amoralists and explain briefly how internalists tend to respond. For now, to be clear, I'm taking no stand whatsoever on whether amoralists are conceivable.

There are two ways of being an amoralist. First, an amoralist could simply feel indifference (or feel nothing at all) in the face of her moral judgments; call her the *indifferent amoralist*. She could, second, be slightly more perverse in her motivations. She could be motivated to avoid actions that she judges she morally ought to perform, and motivated to perform actions precisely in virtue of their being wrong or immoral. Call such an inversely motivated amoralist an *immoralist*.[15]

Some indifferent amoralists strike us as horrific, like a mercenary who seems to know fully well that what he does is immoral, but simply doesn't care.[16] But there are other, more banal cases. Students confronted with Peter Singer's global charity arguments sometimes sound like this. They may agree with the arguments, but be left motivationally cold in their wake. They say things like, 'I get that I should; I just don't want to.'

Immoralists, on the other hand, are motivated to do the wrong thing in virtue of its being morally forbidden. We might look to spiteful teenage rebellion or even Satanism ('Evil, be thou my good!' cries Milton's Satan). Again, though, cases need not be so extreme. In his *Confessions*, Saint Augustine writes about how he and his friends stole some pears, 'only to enjoy the theft itself and the sin.'[17] Not only does he open the passage by saying that surely the Lord does condemn theft, but readily acknowledges that he didn't even want the pears. He says of himself and his fellow ruffians, 'our real pleasure *consisted* in doing something that was forbidden' (emphasis mine).

Another example, surprisingly similar though fictional, comes from a Yukio Mishima novel, *The Temple of the Golden Pavilion*. The narrator, a Buddhist monk at the titular temple, says things very similar to Augustine. 'My small theft had made me cheerful. The first things that my contact with Kashiwagi always produced were small acts of immorality, small desecrations, small evils. These always made me cheerful.'[18] Here, he finds enjoyment in these small evils precisely because they are small evils. These examples help us bear in mind that the immoralist doesn't have to be motivated to commit what he judges to be terrible evils. Small ones further the externalist cause just as well.

The internalist can, and typically does, respond in one of three ways. First, she can argue that any of the defeating conditions are met: maybe the unmotivated students are practically irrational; maybe they suffer from some psychological aberration. Second, the internalist can argue that amoralists do feel *some* motivation, just not enough to override their other concerns. Maybe the mercenary is just a teensy bit motivated by his judgment that killing is wrong, but really cares much more about reaping his financial reward. Lastly, when these don't seem to fit, the internalist may respond that the proposed amoralists don't really make sincere moral judgments or don't really have mastery of moral terms. Sure, they can use moral language like 'ought' and 'moral' and 'wrong' fluently, but they don't experience the normativity that these concepts necessarily involve. Maybe they're unable to *really 'get'* goodness. Or maybe their use of 'good' just means something like 'what's conventionally seen as good'. (It's easy to thus interpret Milton's words above: 'Evil, be thou my good!' in Satan's mouth means '*God's* evil is *my* good!'[19]) For that reason, this is sometimes called the inverted commas response.[20]

It's easy to see, at this point, how the debate has come to a kind of stalemate. A discussion that rests so heavily on whether such characters are conceivable will have advocates on either side digging in heels: one side maintaining that characters like the mercenary and Augustine are (at least) conceivable, while the other explains away those intuitions.

Later, I will present my own worries about moral internalism. But before doing so, I would like to examine a related thesis I'll call normative (motivational) internalism.

2. The anaesthetic

2.1 What is aesthetic internalism?

If we are interested in the relationship that motivation has to aesthetic judgment, we must first get clear on what kinds of aesthetic judgments we're concerned with. And really, we're interested in aesthetic judgments as parallel to moral internalism as characterized above, so the best approximation will look something like this:

> **Aesthetic (motivational) internalism**: Necessarily, if someone judges that she aesthetically ought to φ, then she is (at least somewhat) motivated to φ.

Aesthetic internalism is meant to be a genuine form of internalism. By this, I mean that the relevant motivation 'follows directly from the content of the [aesthetic] judgment itself,'[21] rather than from the judgment conjoined with any other desires or beliefs.

Two urgent questions arise. First, exactly what kinds of judgments are we dealing with? Second, what kinds of actions are supported by those judgments?

There are two kinds of aesthetic judgments we might be talking about, which we can call 'thick' and 'thin'. Thick aesthetic judgments involve concepts like *elegant, cute, moving,* and plausibly even *beautiful*.[22] These concepts contain a descriptive element, despite being terms of aesthetic praise. A thin aesthetic term, like a thin moral term, contains no descriptive element. Maybe 'aesthetic' is such a term, although it can sound roughly synonymous with 'beautiful'. Better candidates are 'aesthetically good' or indeed simply 'good' when understood to have an aesthetic ring to it (the sense of 'good' used in 'a good painting'). Similarly, as I'll argue below, we can think of 'aesthetically ought' or simply 'ought' when understood to have an aesthetic ring to it.

In this paper, I will be primarily concerned with thin aesthetic judgments. This is in large part because an aesthetic internalism that involves thick aesthetic judgments will right away strike some as bad. It does not, after all, match most characterizations of moral internalism, which usually invoke 'thin' moral terms, such as 'ought', 'right', or 'good'.

I would, however, like to pause for a moment on this. If the thought is that beauty's thickness, so to speak, makes it too narrow a concept, then thick ethical concepts shouldn't be admitted to have motivational force, either. But this seems ridiculous: if I sincerely judge that opening a door for someone is kind, then one would think that I would be motivated to do so, though again with the usual caveats that it need not be an overriding motivation, since other considerations may outweigh this small kindness. Internalist intuitions apply to thick ethical terms much like they do to 'good' and 'right'.[23] In fact, Ragnar Francén Olinder describes the moral judgment relevant to internalism as any 'moral opinion'.[24] If we grant that judgments using thick terms reflect moral opinions, then they should count just as well as judgments involving thin ones.

So, though I don't think aesthetic internalism involving thick judgments should be dismissed out of hand, I won't explore this any further here. We will understand the relevant aesthetic judgments as thin rather thick, even if other formulations would be equally viable. One further point worth clarifying is the choice among thin aesthetic judgments: judgments regarding aesthetic 'good', 'rightness', or 'ought'. I have chosen judgments of the form *that one aesthetically ought to φ* to maintain the closest parallel to moral internalism. That said, I suspect that judgments that something is aesthetically valuable or aesthetically good will also work for internalist purposes,[25] as well as perhaps any aesthetic judgments that favor φing (rather than judgments *that one aesthetically ought to φ*). I won't defend this any further here, but I discuss the point in more detail in Section 4.2 below.

Next, we want to know whether there are in fact any actions enjoined by aesthetic judgments. A negative answer may seem intuitive, especially since it's quite a common thought that aesthetics differs from ethics in that it is not genuinely action-guiding. I don't think this is even close to being true.

Claims that aesthetics has nothing to say about action take many forms. Aesthetics isn't practical in the way that morality is;[26] aesthetics doesn't concern us as decision-making agents but only as appreciators or observers;[27] aesthetics is passive, while morality is active. The following passage from Sinnott-Armstrong is a representative statement of this sort: 'If moral judgments have motivation built into them, that would seem to be because they are practical,' after which he adds that it's 'not clear whether normative aesthetic judgments have any special motivation built into them.'[28] Here, I actually don't want or need to disagree with anything Sinnott-Armstrong says, but only with the implied premise that normative aesthetic judgments are not practical. To show that, we can look to some examples.

The most obvious place to look first is artistic activity, at the decisions artists make.[29] Which chord would be the most beautiful one to have next in this progression? I ought to play that one. Which word fits aesthetically best here? I ought to write that one. Which brush will create the most interesting texture? I ought to use that one. In all of these cases, the artist makes an aesthetic judgment that enjoins a certain action. But we can go beyond such cases in two ways: First, by seeing that many of our activities are relevantly artist-like, and second, by recognizing that aesthetic appreciation is not as passive as it might seem.

We non-artists must actually make such decisions quite frequently. Inspired by Nietzsche, we can take a very high-minded approach to this. 'We want to be the poets of our life,' he writes in §299 of *The Gay Science*. We have to craft our lives and our life stories, he thinks, and we ought to make them aesthetically pleasing, beautiful and poetic in their charm and appeal. To create a life with a coherent narrative structure, and better yet, a subtle and poignant one, is a norm – a clearly aesthetic one – that can guide our individual decisions and actions.

If this seems too highfalutin, the rest of the passage gives us more to work with. Nietzsche writes that we must be poets 'first of all in the smallest, most everyday matters.'[30] We can see, without straining too much, that aesthetic judgments constantly affect our ordinary decisions. Those who have undertaken any home remodeling will recognize this. Which color would look best on these walls? Which furniture is most aesthetically pleasing? Which molding best fits the aesthetic of the room?

Blinds? Curtains? Fluorescent or incandescent bulbs? Think also of decisions we make about our personal appearance. Which shoes? Which color shirt? We decide to cut our hair a certain way based on its look and to pick certain soaps over others because they simply smell nicer. We consider aesthetics when we compose an essay or a talk in trying to weigh clarity, simplicity, elegance, and wit. We even make aesthetic choices with what to do in our spare time: A hot, sunny day? How lovely to go to the beach! A crisp autumn day? Why, I ought to go for a hayride and do some apple picking! Or on a bigger scale: Will I move to the country or the city? Well, the country is idyllic, but the city has its bustling charm, too.[31]

It's certainly true that, in practice, these aren't typically purely aesthetic judgments. There are usually moral and prudential issues mixed in when we actually deliberate about such decisions. These shoes were made in a sweatshop; I'm allergic to the aloe in this soap; I sunburn too easily to lounge on the beach all day. However, we can set aside the moral and practical issues or, supposing that they aren't issues (say, if the shoes didn't have a pernicious origin), we can simply ask which shoes are the most aesthetically pleasing. Roger Scruton gives the example of fitting a door in a wall. We can decide whether it 'looks right' even with all the other constraints (codes, health, safety) met.[32] In such a case, we're making an aesthetic judgment that translates clearly into a course of action.

I hope it's becoming apparent how frequently we make judgments that, aesthetically speaking, we ought to perform a certain action or pursue a certain course of action. And lest we begin to think that this leaves the appreciator–observer question untouched, we can consider how the above examples shade into cases of actions that we perform *qua* observers. A positive aesthetic assessment of Shakespeare can enjoin one to go see *Macbeth*. A positive aesthetic assessment of jazz translates into the thought that sometimes one ought to listen to jazz. While watching a play or listening to music are themselves in some sense passive activities, they are activities that we must elect to pursue. It's not as if I'm going to find myself sitting in a theater watching *Macbeth* without having made any related decisions to get me there (barring some pretty bizarre circumstances). I have to decide to *go to the theater* and *buy a ticket* and *sit down* and *direct my attention to the stage* and …. And my primary motivation, very plausibly, for doing such a thing is my aesthetic judgment that I ought to because, say, Shakespeare is good, this theater company is good, or this actor is good.

So, although it's obvious what sorts of actions are enjoined by moral judgments, we've seen that there are a great many actions enjoined by aesthetic judgments too, even if they don't seem obvious at first. Some are properly art creation, but others involve aesthetically curating our lives in a broader sense, whether creative (home decoration) or experiential (seeing a play). A brief aside on this point: The main difference, I think, between the creative and the experiential cases is that the former are judgments that explicitly favor a particular action, φing, while the latter may be more general. The musician thinks she should play this chord; the home remodeler thinks he should buy this dining set. The observer cases don't always take this form, or at least not directly. If I judge that Shakespeare is a phenomenal playwright, that may translate to an action like *go see Macbeth*. Now, it may do so only indirectly, via an intermediate judgment, e.g., that I ought to see plays of aesthetic value, but notice that this general, intermediate judgment is also an aesthetic one.

Though I'll argue that it's ultimately wrong, there's something appealing about aesthetic internalism, which takes judgments like those above and adds the internalist claim that such judgments are necessarily accompanied by some motivation to φ. Our motivations often do accompany our aesthetic judgments, in both the artist-like and the observer cases. It would be surprising if an author recognized that a certain word would be aesthetically best without being at all motivated to write that word. It would be surprising to encounter someone who recognized that two dining sets were equal in all moral, financial, and prudential respects, but wasn't at all motivated to purchase the aesthetically better set.

Similarly, there's something suspicious about someone who often talks about how good jazz is, but who never seems to actually listen to it. Or take the phenomenon of guilty pleasures. These pleasures are guilty precisely because we recognize that they are aesthetically atrocious and thoroughly unedifying. The turn of phrase suggests that the simple hedonistic pleasure we get from such things *overrides* the guilt we feel indulging in something of little to no worth. It's not that we don't feel the pull of aesthetic value at all – we do; it's just that our motivation not to engage with it is outweighed by our pleasure when we do, or maybe we're just aesthetically akratic.

Despite the initial appeal of such a principle, I think we should reject it. And it's really not hard to do so.

2.2 Why not aesthetic internalism?

It is a commonplace when talking about art (and the aesthetic domain generally) that there is a difference between liking something and thinking that it's good. This commonplace persists even among non-philosophers, i.e., people who are much less interested in drawing distinctions than philosophers. I confess that I like plenty of books and movies that I don't think are aesthetically good. I also acknowledge that some music is extremely good without really liking it at all. So, while it's plausible that liking certain art (or other aesthetic objects) is intimately tied up with our motivations, it's implausible that liking certain art is tied up with our judgments about what's good. Moreover, our motivations look to track our likes rather than our aesthetic judgments. The rest of this section will be devoted to examining this basic intuition more closely, and looking at aesthetic analogs of the amoralist.

As in the moral case, there are two ways of failing to be motivated in accordance with one's aesthetic judgments. One might be simply left cold in the face of such a judgment; call such a person the *indifferent anaesthetic*. Alternatively, one might be inversely motivated by an aesthetic judgment; call such a person the *inaesthetic*. I think we can, without too much imaginative strain, conceive of both types of characters. (And recall that, to undermine the conceptual claim, all that we need is that they be conceivable.) Let's look first at indifferent anaesthetics.

Imagine an artist whose primary goal is to make money and so remains unmoved by concerns of aesthetic quality. Yes, leaving the cloying cottage out would make for a higher quality painting, and so, yes, he aesthetically ought to leave it out, but so what? The landscape with the cloying cottage will sell. The internalist reading of the case will probably have it that he has some overridden motivation to leave it

out. He is moved by aesthetic considerations, but is just more moved by financial or hedonic ones. Here, though, it helps to take a wider view of the case. It's not that his motivation to make good art is *outweighed*; it's that his very reason for creating the painting in the first place is to make money – not to make good art. It may even be that his whole aim in developing painting skills was to make money (nobody ever said he was very clever). He went to school, honed his technique, and practiced constantly with the express aim of making money. Along the way, he's of course encountered enough art to have formed opinions about what's good and what's bad, but that's not what *he's* about. Thus, his recognition of the aesthetic oughts at play has no bearing on his motivation.

We can also envision the following exchange between two diners: 'A. You ought to have the Chablis. (One *always* has white wine with fish.) B. I don't care. I prefer red.'[33] There are two ways of hearing this conversation: one in which A is merely noting a convention, and thus making an inverted commas 'ought' judgment, but another in which A is making a genuine aesthetic judgment, and one that B may even agree with. But even if we imagine B agreeing with the judgment that white wine is an aesthetically better accompaniment to fish, and thus that he ought to have a white, B may simply prefer to drink a red. The internalist will understand the case, perhaps, as B agreeing and thus having an overridden motive to have the Chablis. I think we can, however, also imagine that B simply doesn't care and just wants to drink a red.[34] B may even acknowledge that it's an aesthetic failing of his that he cannot enjoy the Chablis. But given that he can't, he's not at all motivated to have it.

Picture, too, a woman who acknowledges that some rap is good and judges furthermore that she, at least sometimes, ought to listen to it. She thinks that it can be skillful and poetic and provide insightful and valuable social critique. Despite that, she may not be motivated to listen to it. She might simply find the sound of it grating or irritating. Maybe she prefers to listen to music that will calm her mood rather than excite it. Maybe she just doesn't like listening to music, preferring silence instead. Or maybe she's simply become tired of the sensation the rap gives her.[35] This doesn't seem to preclude her in any way, as the internalist would have it, from making sincere aesthetic judgments about music or rap in particular, nor do we have to interpret her as not *really getting* what it is to be aesthetically good or for there to be aesthetic considerations that tell in favor of a particular action. We could even (though of course need not) suppose that she *wants to want to* listen to rap. But this doesn't mean that she wants – that she is in fact motivated – to listen to it. Indeed, it's premised on her not wanting to do so.[36]

These have all been cases of indifferent anaesthetics, where the aesthetic judgment in favor of φing isn't accompanied by motivation to φ. But inaesthetics, inversely motivated anaesthetics, are not hard to come by either.

Toward the end of *A Picture of Dorian Gray*, Dorian turns from worshipping aesthetics to detesting it. Oscar Wilde writes of him, 'Ugliness that had once been hateful to him because it made things real, became dear to him now for that very reason.'[37] The Mishima novel carries a similar example. The monk ends up destroying the very temple that he sees as the most beautiful thing in existence. Late in the novel, we read, "'Beauty, beautiful things," I continued, "those are now my most deadly enemies,"'[38] and many other passages express the same sentiment. Neither

character recognizes any aesthetic qualities except beauty. For them, beauty just is aesthetic goodness, and they are motivated to avoid and even destroy things they judge to be aesthetically good. Thus, these characters can both judge that they aesthetically ought to perform a certain action, but are moved by that very thought to *avoid* that action.

A committed Bourdieusian, too, may be able to recognize aesthetic goodness when she sees it, but will connect it essentially with classism and consumerism. She doesn't have to be using 'aesthetic goodness' (in inverted commas) rather than *aesthetic goodness*. She may recognize the real aesthetic value of certain art, but claim that *the very idea* of aesthetic value is morally and politically pernicious. She might then be inversely motivated: she will tell others to rethink their attitudes and actions; she will protest; she may even be motivated to deface or destroy aesthetically valuable works. For her, the very thought that she aesthetically ought to, say, experience or promote something gives her motivation, not to experience or promote it, but to avoid and protest it. Such a person is not so far removed from a version of Plato who recognizes that some art is of aesthetic value, but that aesthetic value is itself not a thing we should seek. On this view, mimetic art is at best three removes from reality: a sculpture of a man is an imitation of a representation (in the artist's mind) of an imitation (the person's body), and as such it corrupts and distracts its audience from the Forms.[39] In fact, on such a view, it could well be *worse* for a sculpture to be aesthetically good than aesthetically bad: increasing its aesthetic quality increases its seductiveness and makes it more of a distraction. Again, the aesthetic internalist might argue that these are cases of moral concerns outweighing aesthetic ones. But I don't think that can be right. The point of these cases is that the aesthetic judgment itself carries no motivational force: aesthetic value is, at least when manifested in art, *essentially* a bad thing and *essentially* to be avoided. As above, the judgment that one aesthetically ought to φ is what motivates one *not* to φ.

A happier case, maybe, is the singer Florence Jenkins. Florence loved opera, and by inheriting a fortune, she was able to pursue her dream of becoming an opera singer. Unfortunately, she was utterly musically inept, but became a sensation, with her career culminating in a sold-out performance at Carnegie Hall. It's hard to believe that all of those people thought her performance was good – it's obviously terrible (I encourage the reader to verify this by listening to recordings). We can imagine some of those audience members judging that, because it was terrible, one aesthetically ought not to see it (except maybe for instructional purposes), or one ought to instead see someone better, or one ought not patronize and support it. But such people may nevertheless have wanted to hear it. In fact, it's likely that it wouldn't have been at all interesting or notable if she had been a relatively talented singer. As before, it's not that the small motivation to avoid her performance is overridden by the greater motivation to see it. The badness of the performance itself contributes to its enjoyableness. If she were better, it simply wouldn't be as amusing or as endearing.[40]

I've just picked a few examples to flesh out here, but any number of things can make someone an anaesthetic. One only has to envision people whose life stories, complete with sometimes idiosyncratic desires, frustrations, or even considered views, have led them to be indifferent to or dislike art or other bearers of aesthetic

value. We need not even assume that the anaesthetic is unmotivated by *all* aesthetic judgments, but just that some aesthetic judgments, for whatever reason, don't have any pull. It's worth reiterating, too, that all that we need to reject aesthetic internalism is that anaesthetics are conceivable. It seems plausible, too, that they actually exist, and so that many of these cases tell against aesthetic internalism as an empirical claim about human psychologies.

If all that looks fine, though, why not just say the very same things about anaesthetics as internalists have been saying about amoralists? Why not just think that anaesthetics actually meet the defeating conditions, that they aren't actually making sincere aesthetic judgments, or that they don't have mastery of aesthetic language?

First, I've already tried along the way to tell the stories in such a way that precludes the most plausible internalist responses. In some cases, I've explicitly addressed why I think the internalist response won't work. That said, I can't show the internalist response to be one that's incoherent simply through counterexamples. But the force of these examples, and of looking to aesthetics in general, is to bring in fresh intuitions about a different normative domain. We don't have to understand such people as being insincere, making inverted commas aesthetic judgments, or misunderstanding aesthetic concepts. In fact, one of the most interesting features of inaesthetics is that it's precisely the clarity and sincerity of their aesthetic judgments that grounds their inverted motivation. The very fact that they recognize aesthetic quality (or take themselves to) enables them to accurately avoid it.

I can offer two further thoughts. One is that there is a widely shared intuition that people are basically good (at least a little bit, deep down!) and thus always motivated (at least a tiny bit!) by what they view as moral. Svavarsdóttir makes the related point that it's difficult for someone whose own moral motivations follow internalist patterns to imagine that someone wouldn't be so motivated.[41] But there is no widely shared parallel thought that people are basically aesthetic (even a little bit, deep down) and always motivated (even a tiny bit) by what they view as aesthetically valuable. While I'm not attributing the people-are-basically-good view to internalists, I am pointing out a disanalogy in common thinking about these normative domains. It's why aestheticism is a literary movement deserving of a special label, while there's no moral equivalent. It's notable when people adopt the people-are-basically-aesthetic view; it's not notable when people adopt the moral equivalent. They're just optimists, perhaps. This difference indicates that we think about these domains differently, and it helps us take more seriously the idea that someone could be unmoved by aesthetic considerations.

It also strikes internalists as insincere or a confusion bordering on incoherence if someone says that she is not at all motivated to perform morally good actions, e.g., 'I'm simply not interested in morality.' I can sympathize with the internalist intuitions here. If someone said this, at least under normal circumstances, my first interpretation would take this as an inverted commas use of 'morality'. But it does not seem to be similarly insincere or a confusion bordering on incoherence if someone says that she is not at all motivated to promote or pursue aesthetically good things, e.g., 'I'm simply not interested in aesthetics.' If someone said this, my first interpretation would *not* be that this was an inverted commas use of 'aesthetics'. I would

think they didn't care about aesthetics, at least in many salient cases. These observations introduce a test (we could call it the 'most obvious interpretation' test) that initially favors the moral internalist, but initially favors the aesthetic externalist. While we could argue about whether the amoralist's statement must be insincere or confused, or betray irrationality or pathology, our immediate reaction is that the anaesthetic's statement need not. So, given that we have intuitions that favor aesthetic externalism, and, I've argued, examples that are best understand on an aesthetic externalist model, we should be aesthetic externalists.

3. A trilemma

We can sum up the present situation with a trilemma.

(1) **Moral internalism**
(2) **Aesthetic externalism**
(3) **Symmetry**: We should be internalists about both moral and aesthetic domains, or else externalists about both.

There is an obvious tension among these three theses. Symmetry says that moral internalism and aesthetic internalism should stand or fall together, so to hold on to it, we must reject either (1) or (2). On the other hand, we can hold on to both (1) and (2) by rejecting Symmetry.

I've already argued for (2). So I will consider that fixed for now. Given the choice between (1) and (3), I suspect that many will be inclined to reject (3), Symmetry. The support doesn't, perhaps, look especially strong. Plus, that way we get to hang on to moral internalism. But there's a stronger case for Symmetry than there might at first appear to be, and I will spend the remainder of the paper convincing you that this is so. The rest of this section will explicate Symmetry and describe what sorts of considerations would count in favor of or against it. The rest of the paper will defend it.[42]

At its core, Symmetry embodies the idea that we should understand normative domains on broadly analogous models. It is tied to the important theoretical virtues of unity and parsimony, as mentioned earlier, but also to the thought that many of the considerations that apply in the moral domain seem to fit other normative domains as well. The phenomena of reasons, 'ought's, and values are at home in all normative domains, so it's natural to start from the presumption that they will function similarly in each domain. This presumption is of course defeasible, but a perfectly reasonable starting point.

In broader, methodological terms, this argument is an instance of the following schema of what I'll call *symmetry arguments*.

Symmetry Arguments

(1) Thesis about Normative Domain A
(2) Thesis about Normative Domain B
(3) The Symmetry Premise: We should analyze Normative Domains A and B in parallel ways with respect to Thesis.

In examining my or any other symmetry argument,[43] we should bear in mind that, clearly, there are differences across normative domains. We must ask, however, whether the differences are relevant to the symmetry argument under consideration. For example, it's evident that we are doing something different when we make a moral judgment as opposed to an aesthetic or epistemic judgment. That may have to do with morality's concern with issues like well-being or rights, where an epistemic judgment has to do with truth and evidence. But that doesn't mean, for example, that an action's relationship to well-being tells in favor of its being morally good *in a different way* than a belief's being supported by the evidence tells in favor of its being rational, or that moral reasons have a different metaphysical status than epistemic ones. There are many issues that need disentangling, and we can, I think, hope to see more by setting these domains and views in relief against each other.

None of this is to say that symmetry arguments are unassailable. Maybe we want to be moral internalists and aesthetic externalists, say, but non-naturalist realists about both. Whether we want to deny symmetry will depend on whether we think any relevant disanalogies are present. Again, there may be disanalogies, but the task lies in figuring out whether they are relevant to the issue under consideration (in our case, internalism). The disanalogy needs to illuminate or explain the dissimilarity; it won't do to simply assert it, nor will it do to point to a dissimilarity that is completely orthogonal to the issue at hand.

In the present case, the trilemma puts pressure on moral internalism and on symmetry as applied to internalism. To resolve this, it is not enough to point out any disanalogy between morality and aesthetics. It will not do to say that, for example, morality has to do with well-being and aesthetics with sensible experience. This, while perhaps a difference, does not help explain why we would be internalists about morality while remaining externalists about aesthetics.

All this is a bit abstract, so in the next section, I'll illustrate how this works in the case of questions about moral and aesthetic internalism.

4. The Disanalogies

In this section, I will consider five putative disanalogies between morality and aesthetics that might be thought to undermine Symmetry, i.e., the claim that we should be internalists about both moral and aesthetic domains, or else externalists about both. We shall see that, in each case, there is no real disanalogy, or if there is, it is irrelevant to the internalist question.

4.1 Aesthetics just isn't practically normative in the way that morality is

Disanalogy: The normativity of morality is practical, i.e., it motivates us to perform certain actions. Aesthetic normativity, while it may be genuinely normative, isn't practical. In the same way, epistemic normativity can be genuinely normative, but isn't practical in that it doesn't motivate us to perform certain actions. This difference in motivational structures is what explains the compatibility of moral internalism with aesthetic externalism.[44]

Response: I deny these claims all around. Morality does more than motivate us to perform certain actions, but also concerns actions, attitudes, character traits, and perhaps even beliefs. Furthermore, as I've already argued, aesthetic norms do concern action. Admittedly, they also, like moral norms, concern non-actions like aesthetic appreciation. But neither excludes the other. Morality concerns both actions and non-actions, and any reasonable picture of aesthetics will have it sharing that feature.

4.2 Morality yields deontic judgments, while aesthetics only yields axiological ones

Disanalogy: Moral internalism is properly formulated in terms of deontic judgments about actions – a judgment, e.g., that an action would be the right thing to do, that one is obligated to do it, or that one ought to do it. Aesthetic internalism cannot be formulated this way, since aesthetics doesn't yield deontic judgments at all. Instead, aesthetic internalism must be formulated in terms of aesthetic goodness or aesthetic value. This disanalogy helps us keep moral internalism while abandoning aesthetic internalism, since internalism is more compelling in the deontic case than in the axiological one.[45]

Response: Here, I will accept part of the disanalogy, argue that it doesn't matter, and reject the rest. First, there are two categories we might pick out as deontic: 'ought's that signal requirement (e.g., rightness, obligation), and moral 'ought's more generally.[46] I won't attempt to defend the view, as some have,[47] that aesthetics involves the former because I don't think that matters. Even if it doesn't involve the former, it certainly does involve the latter. Furthermore, the plausibility of internalism doesn't depend on the judgments' being deontic in the former sense. I'll argue for these two claims in turn.

I've already defended the first point, that aesthetics involves the latter sort of 'ought' judgments. Aesthetics is practical and it does enjoin certain actions. Those two features make it evident that we can talk very sensibly about aesthetic 'ought' judgments.[48]

For the objection to succeed, then, the plausibility of internalism has to depend on the remaining disanalogy – that we have ethical judgments of requirement, but no such corresponding aesthetic judgments. Put this way, though, the objection isn't nearly as strong as it appeared. Speaking only within the moral domain, judgments of rightness seem no more motivating than other favoring moral judgments.

While some do defend a rightness-based version of moral internalism,[49] such defenses don't rely in any important way on the judgment being one of rightness,

rather than a more general 'ought' or, I suspect, even an axiological moral judgment. In fact, defenses of moral internalism more commonly characterize the judgment as deontic in the more general sense above, i.e., as simply involving moral 'ought' judgments.[50] Some are explicitly axiological, where the judgment is that an action is morally good.[51] Others are more encompassing yet, where motivation is necessarily connected to any judgment that involves a 'moral opinion'[52] or any moral judgment, period.[53] We don't seem to lose any internalist intuitions when we move from a rightness judgment to an 'ought' judgment or to a moral goodness judgment. Put differently, it would be bizarre if we were only motivated by an action's being the right one, rather than by its being one that we ought to perform, one of very high moral value, or the best one available.

The plausibility of moral internalism does not seem to depend on whether we pick a version that uses the concept of moral rightness, so moral internalism can't derive any extra force over aesthetic internalism from involving such a concept. They should be on equal footing, as far as the deontic or axiological concepts involved are concerned.

4.3 Moral reasons are overriding (maybe even conceptually so), but aesthetic reasons aren't

Disanalogy: A difference in the normative structures of these domains is that moral reasons always override non-moral reasons. Internalism is more plausible for judgments involving overriding reasons than for judgments involving non-overriding reasons.[54]

Response: There are many reasons to doubt that morality is always overriding, but I don't have the space to present them here. More importantly, even if we suppose that moral reasons are always overriding, it's not clear that this has any implications for moral motivation. All kinds of judgments are implicated in our decisions. We purchase cable television or fancy smartphones instead of donating to charity. Many continue to eat meat in the face of its moral questionability (largely due, in fact, to aesthetic considerations – it tastes a lot better than fake meat!). Moral *judgments* certainly aren't *motivationally* overriding, whatever we might think of the weight of moral reasons for such decisions. So there's no clear path from the overridingness of moral reasons, even if true, to a relevant disanalogy between amoralists and anaesthetics.

4.4 Morality is categorical, while aesthetics isn't

Disanalogy: Morality is categorical, i.e., moral judgments apply to us regardless of what we want, but aesthetics isn't. Moral internalism is thus more compelling than aesthetic internalism, since internalism makes more sense for categorical judgments than for merely hypothetical ones.[55]

Response: We could resist the premise that morality and aesthetics are different in their categoricity,[56] but it's more illuminating to grant it. Again, I think there are two slightly different things categoricity might mean. It might mean, first, that moral reasons or demands apply to us regardless of what we want. This brings it very close to

the thought that morality is objective. It might, second, mean something about judgments (rather than the status of the reasons). That is, perhaps it is part of making a moral judgment that *one takes* the reasons to apply to someone, regardless of her desires. So, for example, it's part of the moral judgment that one ought to φ in circumstances C, that anybody ought to φ in C, regardless of her desires.[57]

Supposing the former is true, we can offer the same response as in the moral overridingness case. The reasons or demands that in fact apply to us do not entail any particular *actual* motivational states. It can't, simply because we could have those reasons and not be aware of them, in which case of course we wouldn't be motivated to act accordingly.

The latter version is on better ground, since judgments and motivation are both mental states. For this to explain our hanging on to moral internalism while maintaining aesthetic externalism, however, the following must be true: the connection between categorical judgments and motivation must be a tighter one than that between hypothetical judgments (which we are granting, for the disanalogy, that aesthetics issues) and motivation. Now, it's true that hypothetical judgments need not motivate us, but this doesn't mean that categorical judgments do. Suppose that Andy thinks to herself that she ought to donate to Oxfam. Since this is a moral judgment and thus, we're assuming, a categorical one, she believes that, even if she didn't desire to donate, it would still be true that she ought to. Again, though, this is simply orthogonal to the question about her *actual* motivations. To highlight this, maybe an example will help. Suppose Andy also thinks that health judgments are categorical. So, when she thinks to herself that she ought to exercise, she also believes that, even if she didn't desire to exercise, it would be true that she ought to. Anyone in her circumstances should exercise, regardless of that person's desires. It turns out, though, she doesn't feel like exercising right now. It doesn't seem like there's anything conceptually wrong in supposing all of this. Why think that, just because she judges (categorically) that she should exercise, she *actually* desires to exercise?[58]

For this strategy to work, there needs to be some explanation for why categorical judgments necessarily motivate. I simply cannot see how such an argument would go, except for relying on an independent, substantive view about the motivational structure of categorical judgments. This response may seem question-beggingly externalist, but here is why it isn't: The internalist thinks that moral judgments are necessarily motivating, and in this section we have been asking why – in particular, why this would be true of moral judgments even while it's false of aesthetic ones. And this response argues that there's no way for their *categoricity* to explain it.

4.5 Morality involves others in a way that aesthetics doesn't

Disanalogy: Although we may disapprove of or disagree with others' aesthetic choices, we never demand that their actions conform with our aesthetic judgments.[59] We don't resent, blame, or feel indignant toward those who fail to do what we judge they aesthetically ought to; we aren't grateful when they succeed. Morality involves claims on others, which we can see in our demands for compliance with moral rules and in our reactive attitudes. It's this difference that accounts for the greater plausibility of

moral as opposed to aesthetic internalism, since internalism is more compelling for domains that involve claims on others.[60]

Response: Here, I will argue three points. First, I resist the claim that there is any basic disanalogy. Second, to the extent that there is, it's inconsequential. Third, even granting it doesn't license different verdicts regarding internalism.

Despite appearances, reactive attitudes and claims on others are often fitting in aesthetics. We deem some artists praiseworthy and we frequently praise them for their artistic choices. What are awards ceremonies like the Oscars and Grammies, after all, but public displays of aesthetic praise? We can also hold artists and individuals in what we might call aesthetic esteem. We think their artistic choices are good and commendable, and worthy of being followed. This looks very much like moral praiseworthiness, and we might very well recommend that others pursue such model aesthetic choices.

We also sometimes feel guilt and shame regarding our aesthetic choices – think again of guilty pleasures. Any competitive singing, dancing, or cooking show on television not only includes, but features expressions of aesthetic blame. Judges and coaches routinely critique as well as blame contestants who fail to perform up to standards. 'You can do better. Why didn't you?!' one hears angered coaches say. Similarly, an art student 'crit' (short for critique, a session in which professors and peers analyze a student's work) can involve blame for aesthetic failures and poor artistic choices, as well as exhortations to perform better in the future.[61] Audiences sometimes, too, blame and even resent artists for bad work. Producers who draw out a television series far past its natural end, just to make money, can ruin an aesthetic creation that we held dear, an action for which we might very well resent them. In such a case, we not only could, but many *do*, write letters, op-eds, or Tweets of complaint, criticizing and demanding different behavior.

There may be fewer such claims on others in aesthetics than in morality, but I suspect this has to do with the subject matter of these domains and not their motivational structure. To suppose that internalism is more plausible in the moral domain because we don't make claims on others' aesthetic choices or don't feel aesthetic cognates of moral reactive attitudes is simply mistaken.

But even supposing that we never make such claims on others in the aesthetic domain, why think that internalism is more plausible for moral judgments *because*, in ethics, we make claims on others or experience reactive attitudes? It is a substantive psychological claim that any actions for which we ascribe blame are actions that we are ourselves motivated to avoid. And it is simply empirically implausible that any actions we sanction others for are ones that we are ourselves motivated to avoid. We may think a person who isn't so motivated is morally worse, but that only supports the thesis that such moral judgments *should* be accompanied by some motivation, not that they *necessarily are*.

5. Normative internalism

The previous section dispensed with attempts to undermine Symmetry. This section addresses a different and independent consideration that favors moral internalism:

normative (motivational) internalism, the view that all normative judgments have a motivationally internalist structure. This view intertwines with considerations of the anaesthetic, in no small part because it is committed to Symmetry's being true. Furthermore, as I will argue, the support for moral internalism favors adopting normative internalism. So, while a moral internalist is not strictly speaking committed to normative internalism, the commonest reasons for being a moral internalist are *also* reasons for being a normative internalist. Rejecting normative internalism thus has implications for moral internalism, and it raises larger questions about the shape of normativity.

5.1 Why normative internalism?

There are two broad grounds for being a moral internalist.[62] On the one hand, there is the strength of our raw intuitions. Many simply find it a very compelling thought that there is some necessary, internal connection between our moral judgments and our motivation, and that some form of internalism is what best gives voice to that thought. That is, in a way, the support for internalism that the foregoing discussion tackles.

On the other hand, there are theories of moral and normative judgment out of which internalism naturally falls. More on such views shortly. First, it's worth pointing out that, even if one's actual motivations for being an internalist are of the former kind, a theory of moral judgment is needed to make these raw intuitions metaethically viable. Naturally, that theory of moral judgment will take the shape of one suggested by the latter strategy. In short, either way, the internalist needs a theory of moral judgment. In this section, I will argue that the theory of moral judgment most amenable to the internalist favors, and in some cases is committed to, a corresponding theory of normative judgment. But that is a theory we should reject.

Why think that an internalist-friendly theory of moral judgment favors a more general view of normative judgment? Well, why does the internalist find it conceptually impossible for someone to make *moral* 'ought'-judgments without being in any way motivated to act accordingly? Because, if there's no motivation that accompanies a sincere moral judgment, the view goes, it's just not clear how it was a moral judgment at all. It's at best a judgment about convention, one with which the individual doesn't identify, e.g., ought-relative-to-society; and at worst, simply confused. And why should this be true of moral judgments at all? Because normative judgments just are necessarily motivationally loaded judgments. This is the defining feature of normative judgments, and what ultimately separates them from non-normative judgments. Not only is it unclear how a moral judgment with no accompanying motivation is truly a moral judgment, it's unclear how *any normative judgment* with no accompanying motivation is truly a normative judgment. Recall that one of the internalist responses to amoralists was that such characters don't really 'get' goodness. The corresponding and, I think, underlying view is that someone who makes any sort of normative judgment without being at all motivated doesn't really 'get' normativity. Such a person can puppet the normative language of 'ought' and 'good', but doesn't experience the normativity of the judgments those words help express.

Before it starts to look like I'm setting up a straw man, let me be clear that some philosophers argue along exactly these lines. Mackie, as I've already mentioned, attributes this fundamental to-be-pursuedness to all (objective) values, and thinks that this is what makes them such 'queer' things. How could we simply recognize that a thing has such-and-such a property (of having objective value) and thereby be motivated to pursue it? Gibbard, too, argues along such lines. He thinks that 'what's special, what explains the behavior that Hume and Moore noted, is that [normative terms] express concepts that are in some way plan-laden.'[63] A bit later he adds, 'A state of mind wouldn't amount to planning if it weren't of a kind that normally plays the right systematic role in leading to action. Otherwise, it's at most going through the motions of planning. […] Like things, I now say, go for ought judgments: a state of mind isn't a judgment of ought all told if it isn't a state of mind that normally issues in action.'[64] He goes on to defend internalism, culminating in the accusation that it would be 'an illusion […] that we would mean the same thing if we came to be indifferent to questions of what we "ought" to do.'[65]

Out of this view of normative judgment,[66] we can extract a version of internalism:

> **Normative (motivational) internalism**: Necessarily, if someone makes a normative judgment that she ought to φ, then she is (at least somewhat) motivated to φ.

This view of normative judgment is not only extremely natural to pair with, if not underpin and explain, the internalist's view of moral judgment, it's one that some internalists have in fact committed themselves to. To repeat, I don't think that moral internalism as such is committed to normative internalism. I confess I cannot, however, see any reason for being a moral internalist that does not also count as a reason for being a normative internalist. (Or at least, no reason that doesn't rest directly on the strength of internalism-favoring intuitions.)

Normative internalism, however, faces an obvious problem: that there are at least some non-moral normative judgments that are not necessarily accompanied by any corresponding motivation.

5.2 Why not normative internalism?

Essentially, the argument is this: Since aesthetic externalism is true, and because aesthetics issues in normative judgments, normative internalism is false (i.e., normative externalism is true).[67]

There are a few things to say about this argument.

First, aesthetic judgments are of the relevant kind to pose a problem for normative internalism. Presumably, all-things-considered normative judgments that *don't* involve any moral considerations are conceptually possible, and plausibly occur at least occasionally, even among the most morally conscientious of us. In a case where the *only* relevant normative consideration is an aesthetic one, the all-things-considered normative judgment will just be the aesthetic judgment, and normative

internalism will fail. Thus, if aesthetic externalism is true, we will have counterexamples to normative internalism.

Second, I haven't explicitly argued for the premise that aesthetics issues normative judgments. This premise strikes me as incredibly plausible, and has struck many others as incredibly plausible.[68] Indeed, the three paradigm normative domains are ethics, aesthetics, and epistemology. Intuitively, what it is for a domain to be normative is that it give us norms by which we guide and against which we assess our actions, attitudes, beliefs, etc. Ethics does this, and so do aesthetics and epistemology. We morally ought to pursue states of affairs that have moral value, or respect autonomous creatures, just as we aesthetically ought to pursue, promote, and appreciate objects and experiences of aesthetic value. Furthermore, much of Section 2.1 can be rallied in support of this premise. There, I argued that aesthetic considerations often guide our actions in important ways. Aesthetics gives us 'oughts' and offers us reasons for action.[69] It also, though I haven't discussed this here, issues reasons to appreciate certain things, to experience certain emotions, and perhaps to have certain beliefs (say, that symmetry is aesthetically good) or character traits (say, emotional sensitivity). To deny that it's a normative domain when it bears so many hallmarks of normativity would require a lot of independent motivation.

That said, there are clearly avenues for denial. On the view, for example, that what makes a judgment normative is the internalist criterion, it turns out that aesthetic judgments, insofar as they don't obey that criterion, aren't genuinely normative. This would be a dialectically unsatisfying response to pursue, though. For one, it looks question begging. Furthermore, what justifies this view can't be that all judgments that we're intuitively inclined to call normative obey the internalist criterion, since aesthetic judgments don't.[70]

Compare this view to two possible, but flawed characterizations of normative judgments: that normative judgments are those that are action-guiding, and that normative judgments are those that felicitously involve the word 'ought'. How do we go about deciding whether these characterizations are correct? By looking at the judgments we are inclined to call normative and seeing whether they match up, or by looking at the broader implications and seeing if there are any snags. If there are, we abandon the characterization. To the first: Are normative judgments the ones that are action-guiding? Not if we make (epistemic) normative judgments about the rationality of believing certain things. Not if we make (ethical) normative judgments about attitude and character. So this characterization looks pretty bad. To the second: Are normative judgments the ones that felicitously use the word 'ought'? Not if judgments like, 'The sky ought to clear up today,' are felicitous. So this is also bad. The view that characterizes normative judgments as those that obey the internalist criterion is in the same position as these two.

Given, then, that normative internalism is committed to internalism in the aesthetic domain, and that there looks to be no non-question begging response, I take normative externalism to be established. There is one final point worth clarifying before continuing, namely that normative externalism doesn't entail moral externalism. Normative externalism just says that *not all* normative judgments that favor φing are necessarily accompanied by some motivation to φ. Internalism could still be true, in particular, of some important (strict) subset of normative judgments. The rest of

this section explains why, if this is true, the moral internalist should still care about the failure of normative internalism.

5.3 Why does this matter for moral internalists?

First, this conclusion matters directly to the extent that any support for moral internalism is support for normative internalism, or to the extent that particular moral internalists are committed to normative internalism.[71] But there are conclusions of more general interest to be drawn, too.

The above comparisons between different characterizations of normative judgments reveal that different subsets of normative judgments are interesting for different reasons. In particular, we might be interested in only action-guiding normative judgments because, say, we think they have a special relationship to ability or to praise- and blameworthiness. We might likewise be interested in normative judgments that felicitously involve 'ought' if we want a general theory of that modal.

Similarly, we might be interested in the subset of normative judgments (that, for all I've said in this section, may or may not include all ethical judgments) that obey the internalist criterion. Maybe they bear a special relationship to our moral or rational character, to our first-personal experience of normativity,[72] or to practical reasoning. Perhaps, for example, the difference between what are sometimes called strong and weak normativity is that judgments of the former kind obey the internalist criterion while those of the latter do not.

In the end, once normative internalism is off the table, the discussion must change. We must ask whether there are any general categories of judgments that *do* obey the internalist criterion, and if so, we must wonder *why* those categories and not others do. To maintain moral internalism in the face of normative externalism will then require substantial argument. Why think that all moral judgments obey the internalist criterion, *given that not all normative judgments do*? Should we think that some aesthetic and perhaps even epistemic judgments actually *do* obey the internalist criterion? If so, perhaps there is a different and more illuminating way of carving up normative space, one that might not, in the end, actually include *all* moral judgments; but will include some normative judgments of each type. I've provided no reason for thinking that an account on which all and only moral judgments obey internalism is impossible, but such an account will also face the fundamental challenge of explaining why judgments that obey the internalist criterion encompass all (rather than just some) moral judgments.

6. Final remarks about normativity

In the second half of the paper, I have been interested in defending Symmetry ((3) in the trilemma), as well as drawing out the broader implications of aesthetic externalism.

Though I haven't done so here, one might attempt to defend a symmetry thesis in other forms. For example, one might argue that we should be internalists with respect to moral judgments and legal judgments, or else externalists about both. I have, however, offered a guide to how one might go about defending or rejecting

such a position. To deny symmetry in this context, one needs to locate a disanalogy between legal and moral judgments that is relevant to the internalist question. If, for example, legal judgments are not actually normative judgments, while moral judgments are, and if we have reason to think internalism much more plausible for normative domains, then the situation is easy.

A different version of symmetry could hold that, for any normative domains A and B, we should either be internalists about both or externalists about both. In Section 5, I suggested something along these lines, but I have not presented an argument against it. I have only defended aesthetic externalism, and the claim that aesthetic externalism entails normative externalism. For all I've said, we could be internalists about some other normative domain due a relevant disanalogy it bears to the moral and aesthetic domains. Because I think parallel considerations will apply to any other normative domain, I am skeptical of this strategy (even if, as I mentioned above, we might want to be internalists about some subset of normative judgments). However, it is strictly speaking consistent with all I've said here.

Having argued for (2) aesthetic externalism and (3) Symmetry, the only available response to the trilemma is to reject (1) moral internalism. We now have provisional (though I grant, not conclusive) reason to be moral externalists. Since this conclusion will strike many as unpalatable, it may be worth assessing it more directly. Above I described two motivations for being a moral internalist: our raw internalist intuitions on the one hand and theories of moral judgment that entail moral internalism on the other. Aesthetic externalism should throw doubt on each of these motivations.

First, the anaesthetic examples are analogous to proposed cases of amoralists. It may help to simply re-examine our intuitions about amoralists in the light of these examples. The existence of anaesthetics, though like amoralists perhaps implausible at first glance, is compelling when we think about their judgments as part of a life story, complete with a complex constellation of desires and frustrations. Maybe we just haven't been doing a good enough imaginative job in thinking about potential amoralists, and the anaesthetic cases will give us a guide for thinking through amoralist cases more vividly. If one re-reads the examples in this paper by starting with the anaesthetics and *then* turning to the amoralists, I hope one will find that the raw internalist intuitions that seemed so compelling in the moral domain are a bit weaker. What is the artist whose sole concern is monetary rather than aesthetic but a kind of mercenary, in parallel to Zangwill's mercenary amoralist? What are Dorian Gray and Mishima's monk but Augustine-like amoralists, whose motivations and narratives are more fully explored and fleshed out? They are like Augustine, but entire narratives revolve around their relationship to the aesthetic and their anaesthetic impulses, and whose authors take care to explain what it would feel like to be so motivated and how one could come to feel that way.

For those who would see this modus ponens as a modus tollens, I cannot offer any more than what I already have. I take myself to have established aesthetic externalism as well as Symmetry. Perhaps aesthetic externalism is false, but if the strength of the argument against it rests simply on the force of the moral internalist intuitions, its falsity is still a surprisingly far-reaching commitment of moral internalism that's worth examining further.

The second motivation is also undermined by aesthetic externalism. An internalist theory of moral judgment is often at least partly grounded in an internalist theory of normative judgments, but aesthetic externalism shows that the latter can't be true. The remaining option, then, is to retreat to either an internalist theory of moral judgments, or an internalist theory of some (strict) subset of normative judgments that may or may not comprise all moral judgments.

In either case, it is not enough to deny *that* moral externalism is true; the internalist needs to explain *why*. But this is precisely what is lacking. In the absence of such an account, and given a normative domain (aesthetics) that does not satisfy the internalist criterion, we have provisional reason to favor moral externalism.

Thinking about the role of aesthetic internalism and anaesthetics therefore reframes the internalist debate in a helpful way, by offering us some fresh and useful intuitions, and by shifting away from direct questions about amoralists to questions about the structure and shape of normative judgments more generally. It also illustrates a different methodological approach to moral and broader normative questions, a methodology that might be put to especially good use in seemingly intractable debates like those surrounding amoralists. The trilemma, in particular, highlights a way of thinking about moral and aesthetic normativity (as well as hinting at how we might approach epistemic, prudential, or other species of normativity). This approach, too, helps us keep in view broader issues that might relate to those we're immediately concerned with. To illustrate this, let me point out one potential upshot of the internalism discussion.

I introduced this topic with the common thought that whatever we say about moral normativity should hold, too, of aesthetic normativity. But I suspect an even commoner thought is that, whatever we say about moral normativity – however objective and realist it gets to be – aesthetic normativity can be *at most* that objective and realist. Put differently, the degree of objectivity and reality that we grant aesthetic normativity forms a floor for how objective and realist moral normativity will be. But a surprising conclusion of this paper is that, if we are more inclined to deny aesthetic internalism than moral internalism, we might actually be in a *stronger* position to be aesthetic realists than to be moral realists. After all, one of the chief problems that internalism raises is, in essence, Mackie's complaint: how could there be an objective, real value that *necessarily* motivates us to behave accordingly? If we build the to-be-pursuedness into the structure of the normative judgments we're discussing, then it is difficult to be a realist. But if we don't build that in, then it comes easier. So, if the moral internalist is inclined to deny Symmetry, a surprising result follows: we're in better position to be aesthetic realists than we are to be moral realists. Of course we don't have to be, but a serious problem that besets moral realism won't actually turn out to beset aesthetic realism. There are admittedly many other ways to accommodate such a difference, and these are only speculative comments. But I mean to highlight the ways in which our views about a particular parallel (here, motivational internalism) between different normative domains may ripple outward, and moreover in potentially surprising ways.

In this paper, I've argued for three theses. The first, spanning Sections 1 and 2, is aesthetic externalism. Second, aesthetic externalism presents us with the

trilemma described in Section 3. We cannot be moral internalists and aesthetic externalists while adopting the claim I called Symmetry, i.e., the view that ethics and aesthetics are to be analyzed in analogous ways, at least with regard to internalism. While it might have appeared easy to deny Symmetry, Section 4 argued that that there are no clear grounds for denial. Rejecting Symmetry, in other words, turns out to be much more difficult than it seemed, and I have argued that the burden lies with the moral internalist to give us a story that supports such a view. Third was the argument of Section 5, that aesthetic externalism conflicts with normative internalism, and so we should reject the latter.

I have not simply tried to break the stalemate surrounding the internalist debate by shifting the burden of proof to the moral internalist, though I have tried to do that. I mean also to offer a way forward for both sides regarding internalism (as well as other metaethical questions), namely, through symmetry arguments. In trying to answer questions about one normative domain, we can helpfully look at parallel questions a different one. In this way, we cull fresh and helpful intuitions that shed light on our original questions, as well as keep in view larger issues about the shape of each domain, and the shape of normativity as a whole.[73]

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[1] Wittgenstein includes aesthetics in his discussion of ethics (1965, 4), while Railton talks of 'generic and non-moral good, often simply called intrinsic value' (1986, p. 5). See also McDowell (compare the views in his 1983 and 1985 (see esp. p. 123)); Wiggins, 2002; and Blackburn, 1998 (pp. 11ff., 60). And many others make similar claims without explicitly mentioning aesthetics.

[2] Mackie, 1977, p. 43.

[3] Gibbard (2003) includes concepts 'of meriting aesthetic admiration' (p. x) in his normative concept project.

[4] He writes, for example, '[I]f there were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong (possible) course of action would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it' (p. 40), but see in general Mackie, 1977, 38ff.

[5] Harman, 1977; Strandberg, 2011; Came, 2012.

[6] Nagel, 1970; Foot, 1972; Dancy, 1993; and Came, 2012 all highlight the connection between categoricity and internalism. See Mason, 2008, p. 141 for a discussion of the first three.

[7] I am not the first to examine aesthetic internalism (see Sinnott-Armstrong, 2010; Strandberg, 2011 and 2016; and Archer 2013 and 2017), but my view and purpose are different. I will make these differences explicit as they arise.

[8] Darwall, 1983.

[9] That is, perhaps 'our best empirical theory of moral judgments might understand them as intrinsically motivational states' (Björnsson et al., 2015, p. 16). For defense of the empirical view, see, e.g., Björnnson, 2002 and Prinz, 2006.

[10] See Björnsson et al., 2015 for a thorough overview of motivational internalism and the debates surrounding it.

[11] See Smith, 1994, Chapter 3.

[12] See Björnsson, 2002.

[13] A more moderate view, not explored here, which Björnsson et al. dub *deferred internalism* (2015, 10ff.), requires only that individuals operate within a community where members are typically motivated by their moral judgments, or have a personal history of having been so motivated (Dreier, 1990; Blackburn, 1998).

[14] The amoralist argument originates in Brink, 1989, though I use the term *immoralist* differently than he does.

[15] Svavarsdóttir (1999) uses the terms 'indifferent amoralist' and 'subversive'.

[16] Zangwill, 2008.

[17] 1961, p. 47.

[18] 1971, p. 162-163.

[19] See Blackburn, 1998, 59ff.

[20] For a discussion of this objection, see Smith, 1994, 68ff.

[21] Smith, 1994, p. 72.

[22] See, e.g., Zangwill, 1995.

[23] Compare Smith: 'Good people care non-derivatively about honesty' (1994, p. 75).

[24] 2012, p. 577.

[25] Notably, Strandberg (2016) offers several different versions of aesthetic internalism with a careful analysis of each. His are all centered on judgments that an object is aesthetically valuable and the corresponding motivation to acquaint oneself with it.

[26] Hampshire, 1954; Kivy, 1980, 358ff.; Sinnott-Armstrong, 2010; Strandberg, 2011. In fact, Strandberg briefly argues against an observer-centric version of aesthetic internalism (pp. 52-54).

[27] See note 5.

[28] 2010, p. 65.

[29] Came, 2012, p. 167 acknowledges these cases, but thinks the action-guidingness ends there.
[30] 1974, §299.
[31] See Kraut, 2013, esp. 244ff. for a discussion of these issues in connection with Aristotle's notion of *kalon*.
[32] 2011, p. 82.
[33] This example comes from Press, 1969, p. 524, though he uses it for a different purpose.
[34] Note that it doesn't actually matter whether we think that there are no gustatory aesthetic truths; all that matters is that B thinks there are, and that white wine's pairing with fish is one of them.
[35] This version is taken from Strandberg, who discusses someone that 'has become tired of the kind of sensation [certain artworks] give him' (p. 53).
[36] See Dreier, 2000 for discussion of a view like this.
[37] 2010, pp. 180-181.
[38] 1971, p. 239.
[39] Two remarks: First, I don't mean that Plato actually thought this. Maybe he didn't. But these views are not a far cry from much of what he says. Second, one might worry that art couldn't be corrupting if it weren't to some degree motivational. I don't think this is quite right. Lots of things can tend to be corrupting without always providing motivational force. Without taking a stance on the actual corrupting force of any of the following, there are examples as diverse as violent movies, pornography, religion, high salaries, close friendships and family relationships, and Socratic thought. Even the accusers don't have to believe that these things *always* motivate their participants to bad behavior, just that they tend to, particularly in the case of morally unsteady participants.
[40] Thanks to Jamie Dreier for this example.
[41] 1999, p. 183.
[42] Archer, 2017 takes a similar approach, but unlike me, uses it to defend a version of normative internalism.
[43] For another instance, see Cuneo's 'Unity' principle (2014, 151ff.).
[44] See note 26.
[45] Harman, 1977, p. 59; Archer, 2013, pp. 75-76.
[46] While some maintain that 'ought' just means obligatory, others have questioned this. For example, Michael Ridge (2014, 27ff.) and others distinguish 'ought' from 'must' by suggesting that the former indicates a recommendation while the latter indicates a requirement. On such a view, there could be 'ought's that signal supererogation, 'ought's that convey the all-things-considered balance of reasons, which need not generate a corresponding moral *requirement*, or broader classes like (morally) evaluative or advising uses of 'ought'.
[47] Press, 1969; Eaton, 2008.
[48] I don't mean to suggest that practicality and action-guidingness are necessary for 'ought'-judgments, only that they're sufficient.
[49] Mason, 1999 (though she often also refers to internalism as a thesis involving 'ought' judgments more generally); Dreier, 2000; van Roojen, 2010.
[50] See Björnsson et al., 2015.
[51] Dreier, 1990.
[52] Francén Olinder, 2012, p. 577.
[53] Svavarsdóttir, 1999, 163ff.
[54] Cf. Mason, 2008, pp. 142-143.
[55] See note 6.
[56] For this strategy, see Strandberg, 2011.

[57] Assuming that morality is categorical undeniably has implications for *reasons* or *existence internalism*, the view that what reasons we actually have are tethered to our desires. Whether it means anything for motivational internalism is a separate question.
[58] Perhaps, in failing to desire to exercise, she is being irrational. This would build something like rational motivational internalism into categorical judgments (and therefore, we are assuming, moral judgments). Though I'm not addressing versions of internalism that include rationality clauses here, a couple things are worth mentioning. First, this is a slightly different version of internalism than those that are usually defended (because it is internalism about categorical judgments, not moral ones). So it calls for a slightly different defense than the commoner versions. To build a response to this, however, one might attempt to either argue against that view head-on, or to defend aesthetics as involving categorical judgments. It won't be surprising that I find both paths somewhat attractive. In defense of the latter, I can only suggest that the thought that morality issues categorical rather than hypothetical imperatives is heavily debated, and once we have allowed morality to be categorical, I suspect many parallel considerations will apply to aesthetics. None of this is decisive, of course, but it indicates a direction of possible further response.
[59] Peter Kivy, in arguing against an emotivist theory of aesthetics, puts the point in this way: 'Imperatives' (e.g., in the form of the Stevensonian 'I approve of this, do so as well!') 'are a means […] the end is action. In aesthetics that end does not exist' (1980, p. 360). He has two concerns here: the lack of a relevant action, which I've already discussed; and the lack, as it were, of Stevenson's 'Do so as well!' imperative component.
[60] Thanks to Daniel Nolan and Matt Lindauer for discussion surrounding this point.
[61] Although it might be odd to hear a professor say something as stilted as, 'I disapprove of this, do so as well!' the sentiment would by no means be out of place.
[62] With these two contrasting grounds for internalism, I have in mind more or less what Mabrito (2013) calls the 'direct' and 'indirect' arguments for internalism (and externalism).
[63] 2003, p. 142.
[64] p. 154.
[65] The defense of internalism appears on pp. 152–158, with the culminating quote on the final page.
[66] There are two kinds of normative judgment we might be interested in: (1) pro tanto normative judgments, on which there is some genuine normative consideration or standard according to which one ought to φ; or (2) all-things-considered judgments, i.e., that all things considered, one should φ. Although, as I have suggested here, I think their arguments may also apply to the former, Mackie and Gibbard are typically interpreted as defending views concerning the latter. For those who prefer the latter, my argument can be applied to it as well. For this, we only need to acknowledge that aesthetics issues genuine normative judgments and hence will, when they are the only normative judgments at play, yield all-things-considered normative judgments (see Section 5.2). In a situation like this, if motivation fails to accompany the aesthetic judgment, then we have a counterexample to all-things-considered normative internalism.
[67] For a different approach to the connection between normative and aesthetic internalism, see Strandberg, 2016, which argues for the same conclusion: that the success of aesthetic externalism means the failure of normative internalism. My approach shares much with Strandberg's, though his focus is on different versions of aesthetic internalism and correspondingly different versions of normative internalism.
[68] It would be impractical to note everybody who thinks this, but for a sampling, refer to note 1.
[69] Compare, e.g., reasons of tic-tac-toe: If I have a reason of tic-tac-toe to put an X in a certain box, that doesn't mean I have a real reason to put an X in that box. In other

words, in some domains, reasons relative to that domain simply do not translate into reasons for action. But ethics and aesthetics do not seem like those domains.

[70] It may also be worth noting that it's hard to see how normative judgments about epistemic rationality will obey the internalist criterion.

[71] I suspect that they are not so committed simply in virtue of being moral internalists, though many of them offer support for moral internalism that does commit them to normative internalism.

[72] This seems to be the direction suggested in Archer 2013 and 2017. He defends a rationalizing internalism for first-personal, all-things-considered normative judgments. I have already pointed out why I take aesthetic externalism to undermine such a view. He bolsters his view with moral rationalism, the view that we have most reason to act according to our moral requirements. I do not think this can do all the work he needs it to, but I do not have the space to address this further here.

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